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Abstract 
The article outlines and illustrates a new social power paradigm based on an 
innovative approach to causation, action processes, and social construction. It aims to 
overcome several of the major limitations of the social science research of Robert 
Dahl, Steven Lukes, Stefano Guzzini, Michael Mann, John Searle, and Max Weber. 
The paradigm distinguishes agential, social structural, and material/ecological 
modalities of power. Moreover, neglected modalities such as meta-power (power over 
power, transformative power) and relational control are specified and exemplified. 
Section I provides a brief introduction and background to the theoretical paradigm 
outlined in the article. The section focuses largely on a major contemporary social 
theorist of power, Stephen Lukes. The work of a number of other scholars is referred 
to as well. The limitations of the work of Lukes as well as others such as Robert Dahl, 
Stefano Guzzini, Michael Mann, John Searle and Max Weber are briefly outlined. Of 
particular importance is their failure to systematically specify and analyze meta-
power, the fundamental powering in any society. 
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Section II briefly presents causal power theory, postulating multiple causalities and 
powering mechanisms based on concrete actions and algorithms. Three general 
modalities of power are identified and analyzed: material/ecological forces, social 
structural and agential influences – typically making up complexes of regulatory 
mechanisms. Intentionality/non-intentionality and agential/systemic are shown to be 
critical dimensions. Section III introduces the meta-power conceptualization (power 
over power, transformative power), distinguishing agential and systemic forms of 
meta-power. 
Section IV takes up for discussion several of the key features of the power paradigm. 
Finally, there is a section of concluding remarks making five points: 
(1) social power is based on multiple interdependent causal mechanisms that pervade 
all social life. 
(2) social power systems (institutional arrangements, socio-technical systems, and 
infrastructures, are complexes of causality). 
(3) Most power relations and systems are human constructions 
(4) Major complex systems of power and meta-power are found in the forms of 
capitalism, state, socio-technical systems and built environments. 
(5) The mechanisms (and therefore modalities) of power are being multiplied as new 
types of causal and control technologies and new socio-technical systems are 
constructed. 
 
Key words: causalities, control mechanisms, power modalitird, meta-power, structuring, 
transformation. 
3 
 
 
I. Introduction and Background 
 Power is one of the most commonly used notions in the social sciences, in policy 
analysis and in everyday interpersonal life.2  Yet, there is little agreement about its meaning, 
and there have been relatively few attempts at systematizing conceptions of power and its 
applications.3  Power notions are widely used but typically done so in discursive and 
metaphorical ways.  Many early publications on conceptualizing power identified at least 
three types: for instance, force or coercion, remuneration, persuasion or normative influence 
(Etzioni (1975), Russell (1938), among others).  Michael Mann (1986) in his major work of 
the 1980s proposed four types: ideological, military, economic, and political; these overlap to 
a certain extent with Etzioni’s typology. Lukes (1974 (2005)) is arguably, one of the most 
important sociological theorists of power, breaking away from the “ordinary” dimensions 
with which Etzioni, Mann, Russell and others worked.4  He also incorporated several of the 
power notions of Michel Foucault (1980), another important theorist.5 
Lukes puts his conceptualization of power on a much more analytic level than many 
earlier efforts by distinguishing different modalities, inter-personal or inter-agential 
domination, institutional controls and organizational bias, and diffuse cultural structuration 
(these are our labels). These “dimensions” are briefly discussed below. 
Dimension 1 “Interaction or inter-agential power” (the “one dimensional view”).  
Power in this perspective is a relation between agents. Such a relationship may take many 
forms: some are institutionalized and concrete, as in a family or group, or organization. 
Others are more diffuse and shifting as in networks. Lukes states that the “one-dimensional 
                                                          
2 As very rough indicators, Google scholar indicates ca 2 ½ million hits for “power,” ca 2 million for “social 
power.”   
3 This is unfortunate since power analyses have immense practical value: understanding power better is central 
to democracy and to movements trying to introduce or develop democracy in modern societies as well as 
globally. 
4 Others have tried to develop analytic typologies of power. For instance, Guzzini (1993) in his innovative 
scheme distinguishes between agency based power and structural power (“governance”) without systematically 
identifying the diverse mechanisms of the two power modalities (on the other hand, his two modalities share 
conceptually in the distinction here between agential and social structural modalities of power causality). 
Barnett and Duvall (2005) proposed a four-fold typology where they distinguish “compulsory” (direct 
interaction of specific actors), “institutional” (indirect/diffuse interactions of specific actors); “structural” (direct 
relations under a rule regime or constitution), “productive” (indirect/diffuse relations under a than rule regime or 
constitution). Neither Guzzini nor Barnett and Duvall attained the widespread recognition of Lukes’ work (see 
Clegg and Haugaard (2009)) at the same time that they suffer several of the same limitations, as discussed later.  
5 Clegg and Haugaard (2009) provides a comprehensive overview of power conceptualizations and applications 
with appropriate attention to Dahl, Foucault, Lukes, Mann, Talcott Parsons (1963) and Hannah Arendt (1970) as 
well as many others.  
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view of power involves a focus on behavior in the making of decisions on issues over which 
there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests expressed as preferences. These would 
be revealed, for instance, in the process of political participation. The focus is then on 
relationships between more or less autonomous agents. A’s power vis-à-vis B is understood 
as A being able to get B to do something she would otherwise not do (Dahl, 1961; Blau, 
1964). Power in this perspective is not only highly visible and interpersonal in character but 
entails A producing intended effects in another person’s or persons’ behavior. Such control 
would be manifested in the outcomes -- indeed such power can be measured in the outcomes. 
Like Weber (1968), this conception views power as the production of intended effects in 
other persons. Dahl (1957), the major theorist of this perspective on power, distinguishes 
between influence and power, where power is considered to have a more coercive character 
than many influence processes.  
While the Weber and Dahl conceptions are often grouped together, Berenskoetter 
(2007:4) points out that Weber recognized power as not only accomplishing one’s will 
against others (“distributive power”) but also with others, that is, power in a cooperative 
sense (“collective power”) (see also Mann (1986)). Similarly, Arendt (1970:44) and Parsons 
(1963) envisioned power as a basis of collective problem-solving, productive, even creative 
in the context of more or less shared values or consensus (see later) (Berenskoetter, 2007:4-
6).6 
Dimension 2.  Social structural controls/”non-decision-making.” Lukes' "second 
dimension of power" concerns indirect forms of power, in particular institutional forms that 
steer and regulate actors' behavior without much or obvious agential action. For instance, the 
way a social organization is structured influences who relates to whom, who has or does not 
have access to strategic power resources and decision-making opportunities, etc.  Agenda 
setting and procedural rules of order and other organizing rules are relevant here as types of 
constraint and control as well as sources of empowerment.  
Here Lukes and others (for instance, Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1970)) emphasize 
institutional arrangements, procedures such as agenda setting, non-decision-making rituals 
and practices (certain “non-decisions” take place rather than the explicit decision-making of 
one or more agents; instead, structural power mechanisms operate). These enable elites or 
those at the top to avert potential issues or opposition from arising or achieving prominence. 
                                                          
6 Berenskoetter (2007:18) points out that this is in line with the Aristotelian sense of politics of “seeking the 
(common) good and happy life,” or in Rousseau’s notion of realizing volonté générale. 
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Non-decision-making is, in fact, a form of decision – and power is invested in those that have 
the authority or position to select (and to exclude) issues from consideration or deliberation.  
Lukes (1974) and Bachrach and Baratz (1970) emphasize in this perspective the powers of 
social structure. They shift attention to how the social structural environment (dis)advantages 
one group rather than another, controlling, for instance, access to power resources or the 
provision of public goods and services, thereby realizing “structural discrimination” on 
diverse dimensions (Berenskoetter, 2007: 9; Burns et al, 2007).  Put another way, whereas 
dimension 1 focuses on the direct relationship between A and B (and where A’s desired 
outcome or “victory” indicates who is the most powerful), dimension 2 power works more 
indirectly through A being positioned in an institutional setting with the capacity to operate 
‘against’ B or B’s interests (see later discussion on the concept of meta-power). Agenda-
setting power is based on, for instance, the positional ability “to create or reinforce barriers to 
the public airing of policy conflicts” or issues (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970: 8). 
Lukes and Bachrach and Baratz suggests that institutions not only make for 
“organizational bias”, excluding certain interests from decision-making and particular 
advantages, but they play a role in empowering some agents to shape institutional 
arrangements and policies. Berenskoetter (2007:11) emphasizes this point in terms of the 
“meta-power” to make and change regimes (rules, norms, procedures), a matter to which we 
return below. State or corporate elites control agendas, channels of communication and flows 
of information and decide about membership as well as the form and reform institutional 
arrangements, thus enabling or preventing some groups rather than others from participation 
in, or gaining access to, positions of power and decision-making (Burns et al, 2007).  
Dimension 3. Cultural powering. Lukes' third dimension of power concerns the 
diffuse influence of cultural ideas, forms, genre, myths, narratives, etc. on people, for 
instance, their definitions of reality, their ways to frame and interpret issues. They need not 
be directly relatable to particular powerful individuals or groups, although historically such 
agents introduced or established the cultural forms.  
Here there is a focus on the processes which shape values, norms, and ideologies, and, 
contribute to fabricating consensus or a shared sense of consensus in a group, organization, or 
community. Underlying all social and political activity are ideas, cognitive frames, and 
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language.7  Power in the sense of dimension 3 operates then in shaping apparent consensus. 
Lukes, drawing on Michel Foucault stressed the mechanisms giving and controlling the 
meaning of ‘normality’. Powerful agents may be able to shape the interests of others, for 
instance in constituting agents and identities through concepts and discourses of normality. 
The power-knowledge nexus of such power mechanisms is established and (re)produced 
through, for instance, expert knowledge (Berenskoetter, 2007:12). Foucault emphasized 
historically entrenched mechanisms or ‘techniques of subjectification’ which circulate, in the 
words of Judith Butler (1997:6) “without voice or signature”. This kind of “productive 
power” (also, see Barnett and Lovell, 2005) is not something that is (or can be) centrally 
controlled but works through diffuse “capillaries” contained in seemingly neutral practices of 
people working in institutions, such as hospitals or prisons as well as welfare agencies, 
universities, and non-governmental associations. Lukes maintained a much more agency-
oriented interpretation of cultural powering than Foucault, emphasizing the distinction 
between ‘powerful’ and ‘powerless’ agents. Nevertheless, both Lukes and Foucault see such 
cultural power as having an oppressive/dominating (or “power over’) effect, leaving open 
when, or to what extent, the process of shaping interests and identities has a 
supportive/enabling (or ‘power to’) effect (Berenskoetter, 2007:11-12). 
 
Discussion.  
Lukes, among others, aimed to go beyond the Weber/Dahl interactionist model, 
recognizing/identifying social power built into institutional and cultural formations operating 
extensively in time and space (Hall and McGinty, 2002). He rightfully pointed out the 
limitations or incompleteness of the one-dimensional character of interactional power 
relationships, focusing attention on structural dimensions (institutional and cultural) of 
power. But Lukes’ scheme (and also for many of the same reasons the works of Guzzini 
(1993), Barnett and Duvall (2005), Berenskoetter (2007), and Searle (2010)) are limited in a 
number of ways:8 
                                                          
7 Carson et al (2009) conceptualize the architecture of cognitive-normative frameworks – or paradigms—and 
demonstrate ways in which they can be identified through observation, interviews, and documentation (of 
decisions, arguments, etc) and which can be especially sharpened through a specification and analysis of the key 
universal components of policy discourses. 
8 Searle, in his book Making the Social World (2010), addresses many issues of power, once again translating 
significant elements of sociology into his own vocabulary (see also his earlier book on the “Construction of 
Social Reality” (1997)), but as in the earlier work, there is much that is wrong and misleading. The failings of  
Lukes and others including Foucault in theorizing about power are repeated in Searle (2010) (but, of course, 
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(1) There is a lack of sufficient specification of particular forms or mechanisms 
of powering. It’s all- too-abstract and not systematically relatable to specific and diverse 
power mechanisms and control processes in the widely varied concrete settings or arenas in 
modern society. Nevertheless, although sufficiently specified and analyzed mechanisms of 
power and control are lacking in his work, Lukes provides useful illustrations. But it is 
apparent that he failed to conceptualize power in terms of the distinctive mechanisms that are 
associated with diverse sources of power. Arguably, for scientific analysis they must be 
specified and investigated in particular contexts. This would have required case studies and 
another basis on which to describe and differentiate the variety and dynamics of powering. 
(2) Social systems of power fall outside the scope of Lukes’ scheme. Such power 
systems, which operate in capitalist, governmental, educational, religious and other 
institutions, are characterized by networks of interrelated power mechanisms, which underlie 
specific social orders (to the extent that such orders are established and maintained – we are 
not referring to failed or failing economies and states) (Burns and Hall, 2012).  
(3) Missing Materiality. The material world is a key powering source affecting 
human behavior and development. Early work on meta-power (Baumgartner et al, 1976) 
identified the structuring mechanisms of material/ecological conditions and processes (see 
also Burns and Dietz, 1992). Of course, such powering is not driven by interests or 
intentionality. For Lukes, interest and intentionality are necessary features of his conception 
of power – but this is not the case with ours based on a spectrum of causalities including 
those of the “natural” world. 
(4) Meta-power missing. Lukes’ “structural” extension of power analysis missed one 
of the major structuring factors in social life, namely, the exercise of power to establish or 
change institutional arrangements, cultural forms, the “rules of the game,” etc. This meta-
power dimension might have been added as an additional dimension, his 4th dimension.9  
Meta-power is transformative with respect to agents, processes, and structures. Even social 
structural arrangements may transform rules and rule systems, but they operate through 
automatic types of mechanisms, as Lukes points out (in the case of Dimension 3).  On the one 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
expressed in Searle’s own language). It is ironic that Searle recognized and applied so much sociology with 
minimum acknowledgement to the discipline. In any case, Searle’s major achievement is to reproduce a number 
of sociological failings, but does it in perhaps a more elegant way than most sociologists manage to do.  
9 In a personal meeting, Steven Lukes told one of us (Burns) that he had considered including a discussion of the 
meta-power and relational control conceptualization in his book (2005), but decided against it. It would certainly 
have complicated his story, suggesting a multi-level model of power and bringing material/ecological forces into 
power analyses. 
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hand, these arrangements have a structural history; at one time, they were intentionally 
established. On the other hand, there are many normative orders and cultural forms that 
cannot be easily traced to intentional/structuring agents and their designs. They have emerged 
in “organic ways”, but still with visible human agency (Burns and Hall, 2012). 
In sum, Lukes fails to sufficiently focus on and specify the diverse causal mechanisms 
of power, that is, the concrete operating controls or influences. Moreover, the major powering 
in human groups and societies, namely meta-power and relational control, is missed entirely. 
The following outlines a conceptual strategy that overcomes several of the limitations of the 
works of Lukes (as well as others such as Dahl, Barnett and Duvall, Foucault, Guzzini, Mann, 
Searle, and Weber). 
 
II.  A Short Treatise on Causal Power Theory.   
Power is universal in human societies, not only the powering between and among 
social actors, but the powers over and between social systems, structuring and transforming 
them.  
1. Causality and Power/Control Mechanisms 
A causal theory of power focuses on the actions, operations, mechanisms whereby 
power may be exercised, controls operate, steering achieved, change brought about, and 
social structuring and transformation realized.10  Power is a potentiality or opportunity that 
may not be actualized. It might, for instance, be inherent in a position” which an agent has 
vis-à-vis others; it might or might not be deployed, and, in this sense, is not strictly 
“behavioral”.11    
Many power mechanisms are built into institutional arrangements and infrastructures. 
Not only have humans developed diverse modalities of powers in relation to the natural 
environment, but that environment exerts powers over human beings and their socio-cultural 
populations and constructions (Baumgartner et al, 1976; Burns and Hall, 2012).  
                                                          
10 Some of Burns’ work in the 1970s (Baumgartner et al, 1986; Burns et al, 1985) was closely related to 
cybernetic conceptions including multi-order cybernetics and socio-cybernetics, stressing processes, agency, and 
the construction of cybernetic systems.  
11 There are other features of our conception of power that are non-behavioral but relate to cognitive and 
symbolic factors (see later).  
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Our conception of power is grounded then in fundamental ideas about causality, 
control, and regulation.12 Many power systems (typically with multiple control mechanisms) 
are established or constructed by human agents; such power systems are, for instance, 
particular institutional arrangements and cultural formations, infrastructures, and built 
environments as well as the typical government agencies, corporations, socio-technical 
systems, etc. The causal relationships embodied in institutions and other social structures (for 
instance, hierarchies and stratification systems) enable direct and indirect manipulation and 
control of large numbers of persons, resources, processes, and developments across space and 
time. An AB hierarchy, for instance, is a common regime – with particular mechanisms of 
control – found in almost all administrative bodies (encompassing military, police, business 
enterprise, government agency, and even NGOs and other associations) and backed up by 
laws, norms, and sanctions (Burns et al, 1985; Burns and Flam, 1987). Such hierarchy has 
been the subject of years of intensive research by organizational and other researchers. In an 
institutionalized power/authority hierarchy, A has “rights” of control (for instance, directing, 
monitoring, assessing, sanctioning, etc.) and B has obligations to accept and obey A’s control 
initiatives – within some limits (Burns and Flam, 1987) (these regimes vary somewhat as 
shown in Burns et al (1985)). 
In our conception, then, there are qualitatively very different modalities of power and 
powering processes, entailing diverse causalities.  We use “causality” in an operative sense, 
drawing on the notion of causation as manipulability.13   Methodologically, this implies that 
one is required to specify the “actions” or operations of a causal process or mechanism,14 
                                                          
12 But this is true, generally speaking, of Dahl (1957), Baldwin (2002), Nadel (1976, 1975), Searle (2010), 
Simon (1957), among others. Nadel (1975, 1976) constructed his theory of power on “causation by 
preferences”, drawing on causal modeling in a highly original way, but of course more or less neglecting the 
specification of the mechanisms. Baldwin (2002) in his overview of power conceptualization in international 
relations puts “causality” at the very center. Our point of departure, however, is that there is not a single 
causality but multiple causalities, therefore many possible “powers” and “powering” mechanisms which must be 
specified in power theorizing and analyses (Burns et al, 1985).  
13 The theory of causation to which our formulation relates most closely is “manipulability causation”. 
Manipulability theories of causation have been developed by philosophers such as von Wright (1971), Menziees 
and Price (1993), Collingwood (1940), Gasking (1955), Pearl (2000) and non-philosophers such as Cook and 
Campbell (1979) (Woodward, 2008). One variant of this conceptualization implies that an “intervention” brings 
about an effect, but the “intervention” need not have an essential connection with human action. It may be the 
result of natural forces (see later). Of course, some human actions and the operation of social structure qualify as 
interventions but they do so by virtue of their causal characteristics (the mechanisms and more generally the 
processes they activate), not simply because they are performed by human agents (Woodward, 2008: 3). 
14 There is a growing literature on “social mechanisms” to which Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg (1998) 
have been major contributors. They have proved themselves invaluable in their critique of conventional survey 
techniques and “causal modeling”. But they are generally weak at identifying those major mechanisms one 
should focus on such as power and control mechanisms. Certainly, the array of mechanisms relating to 
powering, control processes, regulation, governing, etc is an excellent candidate for their “analytic approach.” 
10 
 
where, for instance, an A influences or controls B through a series of concrete actions or 
operations. It may also be that B in turn influences A through various acts or ploys of her 
own. Reciprocal causality and mutual causality fit naturally into this conception (such ideas 
can be traced to early work in the area of socio-cybernetics with Walter Buckley (1967) and 
others (Burns, 2006)).15 Manipulability notions of causation point to direct as well as indirect 
types of social causality operating over time and space. The key to power investigations and 
analysis according to our approach is the specification of the concrete mechanisms, whether 
agential, social structural, or material.    
Much of the uncertainty and confusion concerning the conceptualization and 
articulation of social power arises from attempts to apply natural science conceptions of 
“force” and “power” – and more generally “causality” – to the human sciences, for instance, 
the notion that there is a single universal mechanism such that “a cause” X is supposed to 
precede an effect Y or that some X produces or brings about Y.  But in the social sciences, 
we observe many instances of what appears to be “meaning causality” or “self-generative 
causality”, or “reverse causality”, as discussed more fully below.  There are mechanisms 
whereby norms, roles, relationships, and institutional arrangements operate without an 
apparent “external” causal agency, but in response to the meanings of contexts, symbols or 
signals. This type of “meaning causality” is largely alien to natural science, in that it entails 
cognitive, normative, and symbolic processes of interpretation and judgment on the part of 
socialized agents. Similarly, much of what is referred to as “causal modeling” in sociology 
and social science falls outside this conception of operative or manipulability causality, 
which requires identifying and specifying the actual causal mechanism operating, that is, the 
concrete actions or operations which show, for instance, precisely how A “influences” B, or 
how meaning causality operates. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
One recent constructive presentation of the mechanism approach has been provided from a symbolic 
interactionist perspective (Gross, 2009:364): “…mechanisms can be said to consist of entities (with their 
properties) and the activities that these entities engage in, either by themselves or in concert with other entities. 
These activities bring about change, and the type of change brought about depends upon the properties and 
activities of the entities and the relations between them. A mechanism, thus defined, refers to a constellation of 
entities and activities that are organized such that they regularly bring about a particular type of outcome, and 
we explain an observed outcome by referring to the mechanism by which such outcomes are regularly brought 
about” (through actions or operations (our addition)) (see also Hedström and Ylikoski (2010)). Also, Gorski 
(2004:17) emphasizes the mechanism approach to modeling and explaining social phenomena: to explain 
something, then, is to represent, and thereby render more readily comprehensible the principle processes which 
produce it 
15 A’s capacity to influence B may depend on A’s capacity to control some mechanism X; B is induced through 
A’s manipulation – or threats of manipulation -- of X to behave in ways which A directs. A’s capacity to control 
some X can depend then on B(s) themselves; e.g., B (or several Bs) partially control X or some Y, which is 
important to A.  In such cases, B has then countervailing power with respect to A.   
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Of course, natural science conceptions of causality still have an important role to play, 
even in the social sciences, for instance in the case of “selective mechanisms” in socio-
cultural evolutionary theory (Burns and Dietz, 1992, 2001). But the social sciences need 
much more. Our general concern is with the nexus of multiple causalities in social life, the 
qualitatively very different modalities, which can be distinguished, and which provide 
foundations for social science power-theorizing and analyses. A great number and variety of 
causal mechanisms affect human behavior. The diverse powers and their contexts are 
distinguished for analytic purposes; in much social life, multiple powers (causal mechanisms) 
are activated and operate at any given place or time (see below). Typically, there are 
complexes of causes operating in relation to any given social process, interaction, 
organization, or sector. For instance, in the case of a nuclear power or airplane accident (or 
an oil tanker partially breaking up in collision with a shore) – with material damage and 
possibly loss of life -- there may be material failure (which might be traceable to design, 
particular weather or geological conditions, failure in a key part of the system, etc.), social 
structural and agential failures (for instance, maintenance or refitting delays or operator error, 
respectively). These many causal mechanisms and factors – differing qualitatively – are 
combined in varying ways in any given time or place. Usually – except in the simplest cases 
– there is no single “cause” but a nexus of multiple qualitatively different factors that play 
themselves out in the “production” of, for instance, an event, accident, or a development. In 
general, our work illustrates how multiple powers and their manifestations in concrete control 
processes operate in relation to each other. They combine in different ways to generate 
patterned and often enduring relations of control and performance (and distribution of 
advantages and disadvantages) – or, on the other hand, the breakdown of relations of 
regulation and control and performance failings and “accidents” (Burns and Hall, 2012). 
Any given nexus of powers and controls – many of them human constructions such as 
social organizations, infrastructures, built environments – consist of partially bounded 
clusters of power mechanisms. While people may try to maintain cognitive, normative, and 
social boundaries around any given cluster, often there are breaches, spinoffs and spillovers. 
The interdependencies in a cluster become linked to interdependencies of other clusters with 
their own particular powers and causal mechanisms. 
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2. General Categories in the Causal Mechanism Theory of Power 
The theory distinguishes three qualitatively different powering modalities (families of 
causal mechanisms), distinguished in terms of whether and in what ways they entail human 
agency and intentionality:16 material/ecological, social structural, and agential forces (see 
Figure 1). The three different modalities of power “operate” (shaping, selecting, constructing) 
but do not do so in the same way. In other words, their causal logics differ.17 Agential and 
social structural powers – the latter observable in institutional and cultural arrangements – are 
qualitatively different than material/ecological mechanisms, although human constructions 
such as socio-technical systems and built environments make use of material and ecological 
mechanisms. The qualitative differences concern intentionality, design, and the application of 
knowledge, etc (see Table 1).18 
Powering processes take place in institutional, cultural, and ecological/material 
contexts in which natural forces, social structural influences, and agents interact and compose 
causal complexes and developments. The social structural features are defined by one or 
more rule regimes which specify appropriate participants, their roles, and relationships – and, 
therefore, their authority or access to resources and the rights to perform particular powering 
acts with respect to the material environment (X) and to other agents (Bs) and to produce 
particular outcomes and developments. 
A rule regime defines:  
 the appropriate or legitimate purposes and goals for exercising power,  
 the time(s), place(s) (situations, places (territorial domains),  
                                                          
16 These three types of power were articulated in Baumgartner et al (1976), Burns and Dietz (1992), and most 
recently in Burns (2007) and Burns and Hall (2012). 
17 Their causal logics differ in that they consist of different kinds of mechanisms, as shown below. Agential 
power is exercised typically (but not only) in interaction. Agents operate with means of control in relation to 
individuals as well as populations – but may also operate on contextual and situational conditions. Typically, 
agency is combined with social structural conditions. In the case of material/ecological causal logic of power, 
there is no human design or intention in the pure case.  (If there is, then we are dealing with a humanly 
constructed technical system). People may be involved in the mechanism, but not controlling it, rather simply 
responding or adapting to it. Ecologies do not work with purposes, designs, or efforts to integrate different kinds 
of knowledge – nonetheless, information flows take place. For instance, a volcano or earthquake is obviously 
not a social mechanism, but it is a power impacting on individuals, populations, communities, and social 
organizations. In general, in any given development, multiple logics/mechanisms operate. Our models of these 
enable us to understand and analyze – and in some cases predict developments. 
18 Social institutions and cultural forms have intentions built into them; agents also operate with intentions, but 
many actions and operations have unintended effects. This is characteristic of any humanly constructed complex 
system. In other words, many effects on the courses of action and capacities of actors and social structures 
(including socio-technical systems) are unintentionally produced through agential actions as well as humanly 
constructed social structures (Burns et al, 1985; Barnett and Duvall, 2005). 
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 the aspects of behavior,  
 powering processes,  
 developments which may, must (or must not) be controlled (that is, the 
appropriate objects of power exercise and control),  
 the technologies, techniques, symbols and means which may, must (must not) 
be used (economic, coercive, persuasive, etc.). 
 
Figure 1. Model of Multiple Power Causalities Impacting on Social Systems and their 
Behavior and Development. 
 
 
 
 ` 
 
 
 
Material/ecological structures (shaping and 
selecting); including technologies and built in 
environments (i.e. human constructions) 
Agential operating 
/directing as well as 
shaping/constructing 
systems, 
technologies  
Social 
structure 
(rules shaping 
& constructing 
and selecting)  
o SITUATIONS 
o AGENTS 
o INTERACTIONS 
o SYSTEMS 
 
OUTCOMES 
& 
DEVELOPMENTS 
STRUCTURING & 
REGULATING 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
Table 1. Three Causal Modalities Operating on Social Behavior Components 
CAUSAL FORCES Agential 
Causality 
Social structural 
(institutions and 
cultural) causality 
mechanisms19 
Material/ecological 
structures impact and 
cause change 
(without intention or 
design) 
                                  MECHANISM PROPERTIES 
Intentionality/purpose/
Goal driving 
mechanism 
Yes Yes No 
Designs & 
Constructions 
Yes Yes No 
Applications of special 
knowledge 
Yes    Yes No 
SCOPE: 
Mechanism operates and impacts potentially on these  
social action and behavioral dimensions 
Interaction Situations; 
opportunities, 
constraints, facilitators 
Yes Yes       Yes 
Resources Yes Yes (directly & 
indirectly) 
      Yes 
ACT: action sets, 
programs 
Yes Yes       Yes 
MODELS, beliefs Yes Yes       No20 
VALUES Yes  Yes       No (see note 20) 
Judgment Principles, 
algorithms 
 Yes  Yes       No (see note 20) 
Roles, Relationships, 
Institutional 
arrangements 
 Yes  Yes       No (see note 20) 
Unintended 
consequences because 
of design, ignorance, 
misinformation 
Yes Yes       No (see note 20) 
 
While we distinguish analytically three qualitatively different types of drivers or 
powering mechanisms, they are typically intertwined in concrete social action and interaction 
situations. Thus, on the one hand, humans through their technical constructions and other 
types of actions establish and change material/ecological mechanisms and their impacts on 
human behavior. On the other hand, material factors impact the conditions of human action as 
                                                          
19 Particular categories, programs of action, problem conceptions and solutions typically play an essential role in 
an institutional order 
20 “Nature” affects areas on which humans depend for life and, therefore, affect their patterns of thinking, 
judgment, and action. But there is no intention behind these effects; and there may also be indirect effects. 
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well as the operation of social structures.21 Within each category there are diverse causal or 
powering mechanisms, as discussed in more detail below. 
 
A. Model(s) of agential powering and control. Agential powers operate to a large 
extent with intentionality and designs (although there may be, of course, unintentional 
causations) and apply knowledge in the performance of exercising power or performing 
control operations over others. Control mechanisms corresponding to different domains of 
human behavior are indicated in Table 2. Agential power is potential causality or capability. 
A’s power over B is typically based on the capability of A to act or operate on one or more 
mechanisms (complexes of actions or operations) and to produce effects in B or to channel or 
change B’s behaviour.22 
Communication is one of the core activities of many “social causal mechanisms” that 
operate over time and space. A powerful nation may want to demonstrate that it is a credible 
military and political threat – so, its control over resources and their potential effects must be 
communicated through “demonstrations,” for instance, President Teddy Roosevelt’s “gunboat 
diplomacy”, Soviet military parades with their rockets and exhibition of threatening new 
weapons, or Soviet, US, and China “testing” of new weapons (Berenskoetter, 2007:8).  
Multiple factors are involved in agential power and control processes over others: that 
is, A (or As) in relation to B (or Bs). An actor with power or control over strategic resources 
must have, for instance, the will to use them; “will” becomes a power resource in itself 
(Berenskoetter, 2007:4). Thus, there are multiple causal factors essential to powering, which 
are qualitatively different. Together they enable powering activity, e.g. there are technologies 
and resources essential to performance of the operations; rights or freedoms to perform the 
operations; necessary support or contributions from others toward the operations; also, 
important here are agents’ capacities or powers to countervail/block or eliminate those agents 
(including third parties) who resist or oppose the operations and/or their outcomes; necessary 
capacities or powers to overcome institutional and cultural constraints; and also agents’ 
                                                          
21 That is, agential and social structural powers are qualitatively different than material/ecological mechanisms, 
although human constructions often make use of natural and ecological mechanisms as in technical systems, 
built environments.   
22 Some social causal factors (as bases of power) are conceptualized as universal in human groups: harm, 
punishment, coercion; remunerations (rewards) of diverse sorts: material; social/ symbolic; persuasion (through 
defining "facts" or "reality"); persuasion by appealing to established norms and values. Also, the operations for 
carrying out these different forms of influence have developed and evolved substantially, especially with the 
innovations in communication and IT technologies (see Burns and Hall (2012)). 
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capacities or powers to countervail or overcome material and ecological forces which 
interfere with, block or undermine the effective performance of the operations to control B 
(Bs).23 
Table 2: Illustrations of Agential Power and Control Mechanisms 
MECHANISMS 
AND CONDITIONS 
A performs powering actions in 
relation to B (Bs) -- by virtue of A’s 
action capabilities, position, resource 
control and her motivation/goals in 
relation to B’s actions & outcomes 
B (Or Bs) Lack Countering 
Powers Or Ploys24 
Constraint 
mechanism 
A sets up situational constraints: for 
example barriers, or infrastructures  
B (Bs) is confined, blocked by 
constraints and unable to avoid or 
overcome 
Sanctioning 
mechanisms 
(coercion, 
remuneration, both; 
other inducements)  
A communicates directives and norms 
and monitors, assesses, and applies 
contingent sanctions in order to induce B 
to follow the directives or norms 
B (Bs) is oriented to A’s 
sanctioning and likely to comply 
with A’s directives or 
expectations. B (Bs) has no 
immediate value priority 
outweighing the sanctions 
inherent in the sanctioning, nor 
does she have viable alternatives 
(actions or action situations) 
behavior effectively regulated 
through sanctioning  
Cognitive mechanism A is able to manipulate data and framing 
problems & solutions in order to orient 
B’s behavior toward certain patterns or 
ends 
B’s behavior effectively 
regulated through information 
control and influence over 
cognitive processes. B accepts 
A’s data and problem-definitions 
and solutions and is likely to 
behave accordingly 
Normative 
mechanism 
A communicates to B referring to or 
appealing to particular norms in order to 
induce appropriate action on B’s part 
B follows the specified norms 
(the likelihood depending on the 
level of socialization and 
commitment to the norms). 
Socialization 
mechanism (relates to 
social structural 
powering (see section 
below) 
A communicates or enacts a role model 
for B to follow, appealing to particular 
norms or symbols. A may make use of 
several powering mechanisms in the 
course of socialization 
B learns the model and performs 
it to a greater or lesser extent 
Self-generating 
mechanism 
A activates in response to particular 
signals, situations, and symbols 
internalized norms, roles, situational 
rules, visions, plans, and emotions 
I. Internalized cognitive-normative 
elements are socially (shared) 
constructions 
II. Internalized elements are self (“own”) 
constructions25 
A executes/enacts rules, roles, 
plans whether socially 
constructed or self-constructed 
                                                          
23 The conception of an agent as potentially enjoying autonomy and capable of initiating action relates in this 
theory to power over self or self-generating control. Of course, this may be based on internalized rules, as 
discussed in the next section. But even when an agent follows norms and plays out roles, he or she may 
intervene, modify the internalized rules, and, in general, exhibit agential powers toward self.  
24 Under conditions where B’s have resources or possibilities to countervail A’s control initiatives, a game or 
mutual power process obtains, which of course alters the patterns and outcomes (Burns and Hall, 2012). 
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B. Models of Social Structural Powering and its Causal Mechanisms 
The previous section focused on agential powering, in particular on one or more 
agent(s) A exercising power over another agent B (or several Bs). In the conceptualization, 
here of social structural powering, agents may still play a key part. Many instances of such 
powering entail agents enacting or performing particular rules (norms, roles, rituals, 
procedures) in socially defined “appropriate situations.” This variant of power and control is 
a well-established conception in sociology and the other social sciences in terms of the 
influence on human behavior of learned rules, roles, symbols, plans, designs, etc. Learned 
cognitive-normative elements and structures shape and “drive” human action and interaction: 
they orient, motivate, and activate agents to attend to particular issues and problems and to 
act in particular ways. 
Such social structural powering occurs through a variety of causal mechanisms. Here 
we focus attention on two: 
-- Rule and symbol causality (“meaning causality”) operates among socialized agents.  
-- Extended structural powering (causality involved in the impacts of the structured actions of 
agents).  
Operations of structural procedures in legal, administrative, socio-technical and 
infrastructure systems shaping and regulating social situations, constraining and regulating 
human behavior, in part, through allocating resources and gate-keeping. 
The causal mechanisms (traceable back to socialization) are the learned rules 
specifying situations, symbols, agents to which to attend to and to consequently activate 
learned norms and roles which regulate action.  Of course, the quality and effectiveness of 
these rule and symbol causal mechanisms depends on the degree of socialization and 
commitment of the agents. Thus, rules are provisionally or probabilistically causal (it is a 
question of likelihood since many factors including agents “personal” factors may affect the 
process). Agency and contingencies always come into play, so there is variation in 
enactment/performance or application of rules and roles, thus producing distributions of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
25 A social construction might be: I am (he is) male, or I am (he is) a holy or sacred person, I am (he is) the 
supervisor of this group. A self-construction might agree with the social definitions or not. Hence, my personal 
axioms that I am female; I am Jesus Christ, I am ruler of the world might not be widely shared with most others. 
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applications. Social rules have then causal potentialities but are not deterministic but 
conditioning, regulating (Burns and Flam, 1987; Guzzini, 2005).26 
While institutional and cultural forms operate in direct and interpersonal relations, 
they are also characterized by their capacity to operate extensively in time and space, 
affecting the behavior of numerous individuals and groups, as, for example, in people’s 
responses to traffic laws, signs, lights, etc.  but also many other forms of legal and 
institutional regimes. 
(1) Rule and symbol causality (“meaning causality”)27 
The social structural causal mechanisms may not entail concrete or observable 
agential causal actions or “operations”, although these may be at play as well. Socialized 
human agents (that is, members of an established culture who have learned key rule 
complexes and symbols) typically respond in particular ways to contexts with situation 
defining rules, symbols and signals; so the instigator or causal driver of action is often the 
self-generative agent responding to signals and cues in a given situation and enacting 
appropriate rules and rule complexes. Several mechanisms of such rule and symbol causality 
– which should be identified and investigated – are identified below:28  
 
 
                                                          
26 And to the extent that actors automatically, routinely habitually enact the rules (assuming they have the means 
to do so), the causal mechanism is close to “determining”. At the other pole, actors may reflect on whether to 
enact rules, or the rules are fuzzy or ambiguous, call for adaptation or heuristics in the situation. The rules are, in 
general, not determining. Such conditions give rise to uncertainty, to which others (as well as self) may react. 
27 Normative order (moral rules, sacrality, etc.) has a structuring effect on individuals, groups, communities.  
Particular norms and other types of rules are activated under given conditions (situations such as meeting 
friends, relatives, encountering a helpless child, or person asking for help, etc.). There is, of course, individual 
variation reflecting differences in socialization, conflicting norms and rules, situational conditions (This relates 
to Ulf Hannerz’s notion of distributional culture or, in this case, distributional morality). Although norms are 
potentially causal forces, they are not determining but conditioning/ regulating. 
28 Agency enters in as actors interpret (and misinterpret) values, norms, situations, actions and interactions.  
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Rules, principles,   Drives a search for 
Roles, self-concep-                 situations, opportunities       
tion, do good,                         to activate and enact                  Enactment/Performance 
gain respect, get  strategies for “doing  
recognition                              what is right”, 
“doing good”,  
gaining recognition,  
obtaining rewards 
 
 
In enacting norms and roles – in pursuing values and ideals – actors externalize those rules 
they have internalized (Berger and Luckman, 1967).29 
 
 
Situations of social action Activation in   
(socially defined  socialized agents 
time, place, agents,    of norms and roles       Enactment/Performance 
particular activities,  that they should/must 
anomalies)    enact 
 
As elaborated in our model (see page 21), rules are applied in framing and defining a 
situation (Burns and Flam, 1987). Once a situation is appropriately defined, actors activate 
particular rule regimes to apply and perform (social structures, roles, norms). The reasons 
may be many and diverse that agents attend to established symbols and follow/enact 
appropriate rules (Burns and Flam, 1987): doing so brings status, identity, ideal and material 
rewards, or simply makes sense cognitively, or feels good. These rules provide models of the 
situation, goals and standards, beliefs, directives, and algorithms. Out of this, in many 
instance, emerge patterned and expected behavior, desired outputs and impacts. 
Symbols (places, persons        particular            perceive and make judgments 
objects; a cross, a flag;                cognitive &      and act in particular ways 
symbols of a king  ;    normative frame,     (ritually) appropriate in  
a president, sacred                        beliefs, values     responding to the symbols,  
sacred persons        among relevant       sacred objects or places 
     socio-cultural  
     populations 
 
                                                          
29 Note that this model differs radically from a “stimulus-response” model, although there are superficial 
similarities. In this perspective, a stimulus must be framed, categorized, interpreted. There is a cognitive-
normative process prior to action (“response”), and the response may be habitual, routine, or automatic, or may 
entail judgment, strategic choice, dealing with issues of ambiguity, or ambivalence. 
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People/subjects respond to signals/symbols as in following traffic signals and symbols 
(of course, there is the potentiality of agential intervention (police action) which reinforces 
attention to and compliance with the system of symbols and signals and the appropriate rules 
of behavior. 
The symbol of the pope, king or national president evokes responses of awe, 
obsequiousness, ritualized behavior, etc. In general, agents “read” signals or observe symbols 
of power and authority and anticipate what would be appropriate behavior in the given 
situation. 
Examples of typical rules and symbol causality in social structuring and powering are 
presented in Table 3.  
TABLE 3: Normative-Cultural Knowledge and its Processes of Regulation (institutional 
arrangements, role relationships, roles, norms, symbols, discourses, metaphors) in the 
case of socialized, disciplined agents 
CONSTRUCTED 
MEANING 
OBJECTS 
COGNITIVE-
NORMATIVE 
PROCESS 
ACTION 
PROCESS 
OUTCOME AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
I. Institution, 
norms, laws, 
ethical codes, 
values30 
 
Agents orient to 
symbols, persons, 
places, signals, 
feelings 
 
Recognition and 
interpretation of 
meanings (as 
socialized 
“disciplined” 
agents) 
 
 
Searching for, 
responding in 
particular ways 
(appropriate, 
prescribed, 
suggested ways) 
Activation and 
performance of 
learned modalities 
of action, 
programs, 
algorithms, 
heuristics of 
responding 
appropriately 
I. Compliant 
behavior, 
appropriate 
behavior 
II. Symbols 
(objects, persons, 
places) 
II. Emotional 
mobilization and 
action vis-à-vis 
symbol 
III. Metaphors, 
exemplars, “role 
models” (e.g. 
heroes, saints) 
III. Incorporation & 
mobilization of 
social 
representations, 
action and acting 
on them 
IV. Feelings, 
Emotions, 
“Drives”31 
 
                                                          
30 Institutionalized values and symbols orient and activate agents (Merton, 1957). 
31 In the “mix” (and distortions, eccentric psyches and neuroses) some actors are driven by tremendous energies 
and extraordinary stamina – which may contribute to individual powers. “The devil drives” also often result in 
personal problems as well as problems in social relations with others. 
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Social structural powering is identified with those mechanisms that affect, regulate, 
control human systems, individuals, groups, organizations, socio-cultural populations, etc. 
with or without engagement of authoritative, controlling agents. In general, collectively 
shared rules, symbols, frames are causal operating factors in the behavior of actors who have 
been socialized into a given institutional-cultural framework.32  Such actors orient, attend, 
and respond to particular situations, symbol displays, and rule enactments or performance. In 
other words, much of this is internalized in actors as rules and symbols, images and 
metaphors (charged with emotions), drivers or motives such as “do good” or “get attention or 
recognition”, seek companionship or “to be loved”, get rich in “appropriate” situations 
(which are socially defined, although definitions may be fuzzy and shifting).   
 
(2) Institutionalized operating procedures and systems 
In general, the theory identifies social structural powers with those mechanisms that 
with or without engagement of controlling agents shape, regulate, control human systems, 
individuals, groups, organizations, socio-cultural or properly socialized populations, etc. 
Social structural powers inhere in procedures, social relationships, and institutional 
arrangements (rule systems), established collective frameworks and discourses that are not 
immediately possessed or controlled by any single actor – although the structures may have 
been shaped initially by one or more agents, “the founders”. 
Institutional and cultural arrangements are social structures which to a greater or 
lesser extent have had “intentionality” guiding or determining their construction at one time 
(when they emerged or were established). They tend to operate to a certain extent 
“automatically” although with human agents interpreting and adapting them to local and 
situational conditions. Many social structural mechanisms are then procedures, bureaucratic 
                                                          
32 In other words, socialized agents carry with themselves social structures, including particular action structures 
such as roles (and associated emotional regimes) and produce their own interpretation, plans, operational values, 
norms, images. And enact them under conditions which are rule specified (e.g., in response to particular 
situations, symbols, signs, behavior of others). That is, much agential action is self-generating (self-causality or 
intrinsic causality) which relates to human agents as rule and symbol users as well as emotional beings (Of 
course, this type of causality is traceable back to socialization – power and authority, rhetoric). They are moral 
beings who express values, norms, plans, designs in their actions. For instance, actors are driven to “achieve 
good” “exhibit good”, to behave in a way consisting with the way one wants to be perceived, defined and 
understood. 
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algorithms, socio-technical systems which are intended and designed to produce certain 
desired effects (at least for those constructing and operating these systems). 
There are numerous forms of social structural powering which do not require obvious 
exercise of agential power: 
 Some structured systems with which agents deal are automated.  One logs on 
and follows preordained procedures. Deviance in interaction leads to failure – 
for instance sanctions are inherent in the actual situations as in 
natural/ecological “controls” over human behavior. Or sanctions are part of 
the design, the standard operating procedures. 
 Designed or constructed materialities – tools, technologies essential to many 
human activities; built environments, infrastructures, buildings which have 
inherent “causal powers” or capabilities. 
 Technologies, built environments, and socio-technical systems operate in ways 
similar to social structures in general having diverse structuring consequences. 
Intention/goals and designs have guided their construction. 
 
C. Models of material/ecological forces (Baumgartner et al, 1976; Burns, 2007; Burns and 
Dietz, 1992; Mann, 1986). A major class of powers that affect human beings, their 
relationships, and their constructed systems are material/ecological conditions and forces. 
There are multiple, qualitatively differing causal mechanisms, for example, in geography 
(mountains, waters, forests, vast open spaces) in shaping and regulating human behavior, the 
distribution of useful and/or valuable metals); geology (earthquakes, volcanos); biology 
(species dangerous to humans: powerful carnivores, those carrying and spreading diseases, 
insects, bacteria, viruses; many kinds of diseases; species useful to human production and 
survival: animals that have been domesticatable, animals which tend to protect human life 
and survival; these mechanisms impact on situations, action conditions, populations, (re-
)allocate resources, operate selectively on individuals and populations, advantaging some, 
disadvantaging others. Of course, material power factors operate without intention (unless 
one is considering human constructions of material systems, socio-technical systems, 
infrastructures, built environments with designs, plans, and goals built into these).  
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Nature’s powers are coercive in many cases, but also empowering (production and 
distribution of necessary and valuable resources): 
 (1) Indicators of the “powers” of nature in many cases have been established by 
scientists and engineers and are used as measures of particular forces (see Table 4).33 
Table 4: Measures of “natural powers” 
                                                          
 33 Also, measurements are made of the impacts of these forces, for instance, in terms of economic damage, 
injuries, deaths, etc. 
34 The Enhanced Fujita Scale (EF Scale) replaced the Fujita scale in, 2007. The scale has the same basic 
design as the original Fujita scale: six categories from zero to five representing increasing degrees of potential 
damage. It was revised to reflect better examinations of tornado damage surveys, so as to align wind speeds 
more closely with associated storm damage. Better standardizing and elucidating what was previously highly 
subjective and ambiguous, it also adds more types of structures, vegetation, expands degrees of damage, and 
better accounts for variables such as differences in construction quality. 
35 he levels relate wind speed to likely damage. Thus F0=Gale specifies wind less than 73 miles per hour (116 
kph) and would cause some damage to chimneys, damage to sign boards, and break branches off of trees and 
topple shallow-rooted trees. In the middle, F3=Severe winds from 158-206 mph (254-332 kph); these are 
“severe tornadoes” that can tear the roofs and walls off of well-constructed houses, uproot trees in a forest, 
overturn entire trains, and throw cars. F5=Incredible winds from 261-318mph (417-509kph) that lift and move 
strong houses, debark trees, cause car-sized objects to fly through the air and cause incredible damage and 
phenomena to occur. F6=Inconceivable with winds above 318mph (509kph). No F6 tornado has ever been 
recorded. 
STRENGTH OF HURRICANES 
AND TORNADOES 
Power measured as damage 
capacity: the Fujita Scale (also 
known as the F-Scale),34 six 
ratings from F0 (light) to F5 
(very high), and F6 category, 
the "inconceivable tornado.35 
 
EARTHQUAKE POWER 
MEASUREMENT 
The magnitude of an 
earthquake, usually expressed 
by the Richter Scale, is a 
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36 The earthquake intensity, as expressed by the Modified Mercalli Scale, is an experiential measure that 
describes how strong a shock was felt or experienced at a particular location. The Scale expresses the intensity 
of an earthquake's effects in a given locality in values ranging from 1 to 12. The most commonly used 
adaptation covers the range of intensity from the condition of "1-- Not felt except by a very few under especially 
favorable conditions," to "12 -- Lines of sight and level are distorted, objects thrown upward into the air, 
damage total. 
37 A VEI number of 0 refers to plume height less than 100m and a volume of ejecta of 1000s m3; VEI 4 has 
plume height up to 10-25km and entails 100,000,000s m3; and a VEI 8 has plume height over 25km and 1000s 
km3 ejecta. The VEI is similar to the Richter scale for measuring magnitude, in that each interval on the VEI 
represents an increase in magnitude of about 10 (i.e., it is logarithmic).    
38 An intensity level of 1 correspond to 2 meters (with flooding of gently sloping coasts and relatively slight 
damage to infrastructure) and a level of 4 corresponds to 16 meter waves (with almost complete destruction of 
structures encountered) 
39 Virulence can also be quantified as: (1) Mean time to death; (2) Mean time to appearance of symptoms; (3) 
Measurements of fever, weight loss; (4) Measurement of pathological lesions (poliovirus); reduction in blood 
CD4+ lymphocytes (HIV1). In general, disease processes are highly complex and differentiated (with varying 
mechanisms). A number of factors can affect the ability of a microbe to cause disease, including a person's 
genetic makeup, as well as the genetic makeup of the microbes themselves, exposure (amount of dose), route of 
infection, age and gender as well as lifestyle of the host. In addition, differences in the susceptibility of hosts 
(for instance, differences between individual immune responses (i.e., because of past exposure or vaccinations)) 
can also alter the virulence of a microbe.   
 
measure of the amplitude of the 
seismic waves.36 The scale is 
logarithmic so that a recording 
of 7, for example, indicates a 
disturbance with ground motion 
10 times as large as a recording 
of 6. Earthquakes with a Richter 
value of 6 or more are 
commonly considered major; 
great earthquakes have 
magnitude of 8 or more on the 
Richter scale. 
VOLCANIC EXPLOSIVITY 
INDEX      
 
Eruptions can be assigned a VEI 
number on a scale of 0 to 8, 
using particularly the following 
two criteria: Volume of ejecta 
and height of the eruptive 
column.37 
 
WAVE POWER (TSUNAMI) Tsunami are distinguished by 
levels of intensity (from 1 to 4) 
associated with the height (from 
2 to 16 meters) of the waves.38 
 
VIRULENCE OF BACTERIA OR 
VIRUS ATTACK 
Virulence has been given 
quantitative measures of the 
power of an infectious microbe 
to cause disease . Virulence can 
be measured by LD50 (Lethal 
Dose 50) and ID50 (Infectious 
Dose 50), which is the dose 
required to kill or infect 50% of 
the test population, 39 
respectively. 
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(2) Earlier research (Baumgartner et al, 1976; Mann, 1986) shows the various ways 
that geography and ecology have played in the development of early human communities, 
states and empires. 
(3) There is substantial evidence of climate change cycles affecting agricultural 
production (shortages or abundance), evoking social conflict over land and food, and 
resulting in increased levels of mobility and warfare. 
(4) Natural selection and its responses and impacts on populations and communities 
(Burns and Dietz, 1992) is a type of mechanism which contemporary social scientists have 
tended to ignore until recently. In some cases, physical or materialistic selection will be 
absolute in that a group cannot sustain itself in a particular physical environment using a 
given set of institutional arrangements and technologies. In other cases, the response of the 
material environment generates selection that favors productive or efficient rules and selects 
against unproductive or inefficient rules or institutional arrangements. 
Physical infrastructure, geography, climate, natural resource distributions and social 
ecology are key selective environments that shape action opportunity structures as well as 
allocative or payoff structures. Certain patterns of action -- within environmental constraints 
and possibilities -- lead to greater payoffs than others per unit of input activity; that is, they 
obtain more or better quality resources for a given strategy or resource expenditure. Of 
particular importance are gains and losses in such strategic variables as material production, 
resource acquisition, population, and rule enforcement and diffusion. We can think of 
environmental response in terms of a function that describes what will occur when people 
take a particular action in a specific social and physical environment. This allocative function 
is usually stochastic. As the environment changes, the allocative function changes, producing 
different responses to the same actions or outputs. Its variance, and thus degree of 
predictability, changes over time. The allocative function drives selection acting on rules that 
are implemented or realized in concrete social activities and established, stable practices. 
Through the development of technical skills, technologies, and knowledge about their 
environment, human groups exploit gains to be made in relation to allocative functions; in 
this they may overcome particular social as well as material constraints (Baumgartner and 
Burns, 1984; Andersen and Burns, 1992; Woodward et al, 1994). They are enabled to act in 
ways that they could not act previously and increase both the overall amount of production in 
that environment and the efficiency of that production. Such developments also result in 
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changes in the environment which in turn alters action possibilities and payoff conditions. 
Ultimately, these changes may preclude the reproducibility of a community, for instance, by 
undermining a critical resource base such as water, arable land, forests, or fossil fuels. The 
theory distinguishes between structural powers (material structures, social structures) and 
agential powers (as, for example, in interpersonal relationships). On the one hand, social 
structural and agential powering entail the factor of design or plan; goals and commitments 
are factors of causality in contrast to the operations of pure materialistic/ecological powering, 
which entails no operative goals and commitments.  
The social power theory distinguishes diverse contexts of powering operations: The 
institutional, cultural, and ecological/material context in which agents, social structural 
powers, and natural forces interact and compose causal complexes with particular operative 
patterns and performances. Typically then multiple causal factors operate in the production of 
“patterned interactions” and particular outcomes and developments. 
Table 5 summarizes the agential, social structural, and material causal mechanisms. 
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Table 5: Modalities of power causation 
Agential mechanisms: The logic of agential powering is the execution of particular control activity in relation 
to some agent B (or several Bs).  
 
Agent A  execution of particular  B(Bs) comply with some 
                  Control acts                                  degree of likelihood 
 
The logic of agential powering often occurs in conjunctioin with social structural mechanisms (although there 
are “open situations” where A encounters a B (Bs) outside of well-defined social structures). Through a series of 
concrete actions, operations, production activities, A has some likelihood of influencing B (that is, A has some 
probability of causing B to do X rather than Y which B might prefer to do). In other words, B changes his 
behavior to do something he would not otherwise do.  In the more common cases, A in his position/role is 
expected/required/responsible to control B (Bs) and has certain rights to perform particular control activities vis-
à-vis B (Bs); that is, B (Bs) is part of this arrangement. Case 1: B (Bs) is obligated in her position to comply to 
A. Case 2: B (Bs) is in a position to avoid or to countervail A’s power. Case 3: B(Bs) is not obligated but is, in 
any case, subject to A’s exercise of power and has no countervailing powers or possibilities to avoid A’s control 
acts. Case 4: B has countervailing power(s) and can avoid or countervail A’s power. Typically, multiple causal 
factors are involved in A’s efforts to control B (Bs), and B (Bs) respond compliantly with some likelihood (or 
not) to A’s control attempts (see p. 22). 
Social structural mechanisms: 
 
Certain conditions obtain  
                                                       Activation and         Routines/habits/SOP 
                                                        processing of  
                                                        relevant rules          Positional matrix; agents    
Rules and agents                            on the part of           act out/perform their roles                                                             
Define the conditions                     Socialized agents    (defined in part by obligations/ 
 For activation &                                                            Responsibilities, rights, powers) 
 performance                                                                  (These include agents who are 
                                                                                       capable/have authority or   
                                                                                       power to instigate particular 
                                                                                       control processes)  
                                                      Socialized agents 
                                                      Who have knowledge 
                                                      And value commitment 
                                                       For performance in 
                                                       Situation S 
 
Observe: multiple social structural mechanisms: operation of norms, roles, rule regime through 
socialized/committed agents (as a function of the degree of socialization and commitment). 
Material/ecological mechanisms: context, mechanisms, forces and impact: earthquakes, volcanoes, hurricanes, 
flooding, heat waves, draught, disease. Complex, typically multiple causal factors – natural “forces” interact 
with built environments, socially constructed patterns of behavior, and actions (possible innovative) of social 
agents. 
 
X*  power vector influences       Y         Z 
 
                                                                      Z* 
 
 
 
As pointed out earlier, the theory stresses the multiple qualitatively different 
causalities (causal mechanisms). The causal distinctions in powering modalities are analytic. 
In practice, most human processes and developments entail varying mixtures of the agential, 
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social structural and materialistic/ecological power and control mechanisms.40 Consider the 
case of the personal transport sector in the USA (as well as many other Western countries), 
which is heavily dependent on the automobile (Burns and Dietz, 1992). In many regions, the 
physical infrastructure, especially the dispersed pattern of residence and of employment 
presents a major material obstacle to realizing an increased use of mass transit. In other 
words, this represents physical or material powering (selection mechanism) against mass 
transit in that proposals to shift away from the automobile and its high fossil fuel 
consumption toward mass transit schemes, bicycles or walking are difficult to implement 
because of the substantial distances and residential dispersion (built environments already 
established over relatively long periods of time).41 In addition to an established physical 
infrastructure, the day to day rules (lifestyles and worklife rules) organizing the activities of 
most Americans assume the use of autos rather than mass transit. In particular, there are 
evaluative rules that associate the use of the auto with individual freedom and mobility. 
These rules provide a form of social structural-powering (and selection mechanisms) against 
increased use of mass transit or decreased use of autos. While these two forms of selection 
operate autonomously of the conscious strategy of particular agents, mass transit is subject 
also to selection on the basis of the exercise of agential social power and authority. Powerful 
actors associated with the automobile, oil and highway interests (the "highway trust") 
actively oppose policies that would discourage or substitute for auto use. They can legitimate 
their opposition by labeling mass transit impractical (due to material conditions and material 
selection) or contrary to values of liberty or freedom of mobility (due to social structural 
conditions and selection). In general, socio-technical systems associated with institutional 
arrangements play a key role in powering processes (Burns and Hall, 2012). As systems of 
organized activity, they limit what actors can and cannot do. At the same time, they define 
and constrain the elements that more encompassing selective environments have to operate 
upon. 
                                                          
40 A whole class of examples involve cybernetic control systems, that is, a major proportion of regulatory 
systems (Buckley, 1967, Burns et al, 1985) 
41 Environments "select" only imperfectly and not always directly or immediately. The material environment -- 
including technologies -- determine which rule systems can be realized, or what changes in rule systems can be 
introduced with some likelihood of realizability. Human agents cannot enact rules which violate the laws of 
physics and biology, although technologies enable them to alter the ways and the extent to which such laws 
constrain and steer activities. Rule systems enacted in a given selective environment may be more or less 
"efficient" or "effective" in directing human and material resources in production and reproduction activities. 
Effectiveness and efficiency must be understood in specific spatial and temporal contexts. What may appear to 
be highly effective and efficient in one context may be unsustainable over a relatively long period (such as 
several hundred or even a thousand years). One aspect of this unsustainability is the increased risk of a gradual 
decline (e.g. atmospheric deterioration) or catastrophe (such as nuclear destruction). 
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Because most power systems consist of complexes of mechanisms, there are often 
uniqueness features, that is, powering mixtures are to some extent unique – although there are 
a limited number of relatively common modalities in the contemporary world. The 
particularities of the complex and the relationships among the mechanisms depend to a 
certain extent on the context and the concrete action or production processes in which agents 
participate. For instance, in agriculture, natural powers are combined with and manipulated 
by human agents’ operations to produce crops and animal products. The production of hydro-
power or nuclear energy also combines the operation of natural powers with agential actions 
and social structural powering. Human agents interpret, complement, and regulate social 
structural processes in such a way as to generate particular material, agential, and social 
structural performances (those desired, if the efforts are successful). 
(i) An administrative rule complex, among other things, organizes, among other things, an 
A-B administrative relationship. A by virtue of being "the employer" (or representative of the 
employer) has rights to direct, monitor, evaluate, sanction (possibly “fire”) a subordinate, B, 
or subordinates, Bs. These powers are capabilities or potentialities of A vis-à-vis Bs.42 The 
rights are specified by rules. The rule complex of the institution may give complete 
supervisory power to A over B, or only partial, circumscribed powers. Power may have to be 
shared with other agents such as labor unions or professional associations. In general, there 
are multiple rule regimes and mechanisms, in part complementary, in part contradictory with 
any given A-B rem of citizen rights vis-à-vis the state provides an action basis for agents to 
initiate claims and counter-actions in relation to the state.  
(iv) Property rights – specified in the laws and regulations concerning ownership – provide 
causal powers to "owners". They may decide what happens to the property, whether or not it 
is utilized and how it is to be utilized – within some limits. They may decide to assign or sell 
the ownership to someone else, either out of an act of charity or expectation of financial gain 
through its salee.  Again, such social structural power is combined with agential power to 
determine how and for what purpose to use the rights, conducting particular powering 
processes in doing so.  
(v) Patent rights – specified by a system of rules – give the patent holder power(s) to decide 
over the use of the patented object or process, and the power to require compensation for its 
use by another. Typically, these rights extend over certain times and domains (spaces). 
                                                          
42 Note that in the A-B process in relation to X, B is the immediate, material “cause” of X. But A has directed or 
forced B to do it. This is Dahl's and to a lesser extent Weber's conception of social power.  
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III. Meta-power43 defined in terms of structuring and transformative powers. 
In the social sciences, power and control have been typically conceptualized in terms 
of the capacity or right of one agent (individual or collective) to get another agent to act in 
some specified way and even to act against her own will (Max Weber (1968)).44 In various 
ways, the most prominent contemporary analyses [for instance, Peter Blau (1964) and Robert 
Dahl (1957), among others] view power as principally one actor's control of the behavior of 
another actor. This approach to power captures only a limited part of the phenomena. In 
reaction, Talcott Parsons (1963), redefined power as mobilization of resources to achieve 
collective goals, and broadened the concept to include cooperative efforts and larger 
institutional venues. While this revision was an improvement, it too missed key aspects 
involving groups, organizations, and states in particular structural and related powering. 
A larger, and historically more important part of social power concerns the shaping 
and transformation of the social and cultural matrix -- within which interpersonal power 
activities and collective enterprises -- are played out. This we refer to as meta-power, the 
capacity to construct the conditions, rules, and institutional formations under which 
individual and collective actors mobilize and apply resources to accomplish their intentions 
(Burns and Hall, 2012; Baumgartner et al, 1975; Baumgartner et al, 1976). Such structuring 
may involve the manipulation of institutional arrangements as well as norms and values. A 
given socio-cultural structure may be viewed then as, in part, the macroscopic resultant of the 
application of meta-powering that determines permissible or acceptable activities and 
relationships of individuals and groups to one another and to resources or forms of property 
and authority. Thus, the meta-power conceptualization breaks with the past by extending our 
perspective to encompass   power and control over social structures across time and space.   
Sociological meta-power researchers utilize the concept of meta-power to explain 
stability and change of institutional arrangements – for instance, the transformations of a 
social system -- across time and space.  Hall and McGinty (1997) show how some agents 
shape particular structural conditions and institutional arrangements for other actors, set 
agendas for organizations, change institutional arrangements and institutional forms, and alter 
                                                          
43 The concept was presented and published in early 1970s by the author along with a number of collaborators. 
And these ideas were adopted applied early by Himmelstrand et al (1981) in Sociology and Caporaso (1978) and 
Krasner (1981; 2011), among others, in Political Science and International Relations. 
44 This section draws on McGinty et al (2007).  
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the form and quality of social relationships and future possibilities for types of interaction. 
Thus, legislators and bureaucrats try to induce the behavior of teachers dispersed among 
thousands of classrooms across a territory. Hall (1997) conceives of organizations to be 
structurations of meta-power and specifies five processes that sustain the organization. They 
are a) acquiring jurisdiction to discipline other agents; b) constructing rules; c) structuring the 
contexts of interpersonal relationships; d) culturing the organization; and e) enrolling 
subordinates as delegates for relational control.  
Along similar lines, Carson et al (2009) see agents exercising meta-power in relation 
to maintaining or changing major public policy paradigms such as those in the European 
Union relating to climate change, energy, food, and gender, among others. This may manifest 
itself in several different ways: (1) elite actors in positions of meta-power may undergo a 
cognitive shift, which results in their adoption and institutionalization of a new public policy 
paradigm(s); (2) or, one elite replaces another through democratic election, negotiation, or 
violence, bringing with it a new public policy paradigm; (3) elite groups negotiate a new 
paradigm and its institutionalization.  In all cases, an institutional -- or possibly a more 
encompassing societal -- crisis may set off one or another of the three mechanisms. Of 
course, the changes may be driven by purely competitive or power-seeking considerations. 
The research programs referred to above have been generally associated with 
qualitative structural analyses of multi-level, multi-site phenomena.  This has involved the 
effective use of case studies, sociologically informed historical or ethnographic methods that 
produce not only a chronological timeline of events, but can place them in a relevant 
institutional and cultural context and demonstrate their relationship to multiple phases of 
development or varying discursive, situational and institutional contexts.45     
For the purpose of investigating of structural control in human groups -- pertaining to 
the maintenance, restructuring, and transformation of social relationships and institutional 
arrangements – there exist at least three dimensions of structural control with respect to social 
systems: control over action opportunities, control over differential payoffs or outcomes of 
interaction, and control over actors’ cultural orientations and ideology. These three systemic 
properties are mutually interrelated and can usually be separated only analytically. Such 
                                                          
45 Another major conceptual stream drawing on the earlier sociological formulation has been developed by 
political scientists, particularly those in international relations (Caporaso, 1978; Krasner, 1981, among others). 
Ulrich Beck (2011) also makes use of the concept of meta-power in the sense of the transformation of rules of 
national and international powers. For instance, in his view the new global economy stands in relation to the 
state as a kind of meta-power; it operates to change the national and international rules of power.   
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structural power, as suggested earlier, shapes and sets the conditions for lower order forms of 
powering.   
In investigations of the exercise of meta-power, as in power studies generally, there is 
interest in differences among actors in resource control, skills, and strategies; the main focus 
is on capacities to mobilize power resources with which to manipulate the matrix of rules, 
conditions of interaction, and distribution of resources as well as normative and ideological 
orientations. Clearly, although an actor may have social power within an interaction situation 
(or "game"), she may or may not have power to structure or restructure the interaction 
situation, the social relationships, to alter the "type or rules of game" the actors play, or, in 
general, to change the rules and institutions governing exchanges among the actors involved. 
The capacity to establish, maintain, and transform social relationships and institutional 
relationships is precisely what is meant by meta-power.   
 
Agential and Systemic Types of Meta-Power 
Much of the attention above in introducing the concept of meta-power has concerned 
agents exercising meta-power and relational control, that is, the agential form. But 
institutional arrangements, socio-technical systems, and cultural formations also operate as 
types of structural power, that is, exhibit a form of meta-power. 
 
Agential meta-power 
Agential meta-power is observable whenever an elite or powerful group of agents 
shape particular structural conditions and institutional arrangements for other actors: to 
establish a constitution; to carry out substantial institutional reforms, to restructure an 
industry, to manipulate or transform interaction opportunities in key societal areas. For 
instance, the state launches major infrastructure projects, regulates and protects workers vis-
à-vis their employers (or the opposite), and, in general, regulates social interactions in, for 
instance, the economy, the polity, or community and professional life. The processes in 
which meta-power researchers are most interested, concern powerful agents, such as 
capitalists or political/administrative leaders, using their positions of structural power to 
mobilize resources in order to develop new systems of production, new products and 
lifestyles, new institutional arrangements, for instance, in the formation of globalization 
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conditions. Structuring initiatives may come also from state agents, for example, to establish 
an infrastructure (airport, highway system, water system, electricity networks) or a regulatory 
agency; or, the initiative may come from a dominant political leader or party with a mandate 
to reform or transform social conditions. Such projects may define new social relations, 
action opportunities, and cognitive and normative frames 
This meta-power agenda has also encompassed Simmelian themes of "third parties" 
regulating relationships so as to foster cooperation, competition, or conflict was well as 
particular power and control relationships; this form of powering has been conceptualized in 
meta-power terms as relational control (Baumgartner et al, 1975; Baumgartner et al, 1976; 
Burns and Hall, 2012). Meta-power was seen to be employed, on the one hand, to encourage 
cooperative interactions, or, on the other hand, to produce competition or conflict among 
actors (for instance through promoting or managing resources so as to shape a perception of 
resource scarcity).  
The exercise of meta-power as an attempt to structure social relationships – the idea 
of relational control – may be used by social agents to ensure the effective functioning of 
institutional arrangements, socio-technical systems, or other social systems as well as to 
promote or stabilize their advantages or dominance over social systems and their populations. 
This duality of meta-power utilization – the exercise of power in the interests of the group or 
community and/or in the interests of the power-wielders themselves points up one of the 
dilemmas in reforming meta-power relations and mechanisms in contemporary society. 
 
Structural meta-power 
Structural forms of meta-power shape and constrain social agents' relationships, their 
opportunity and incentive structures, their interactions and payoffs. That is, the normal 
operation or functioning of institutions and institutional arrangements such as those of 
capitalism, state agencies, and civil society associations entail organizational biases that 
shape and reshape interaction opportunities, careers, income, status, limited power over 
others as well as constrain certain activities and developments in more or less predictable 
ways. In other words, rules, procedures, and programs generate and regulate patterns of social 
activities, their effects and developments. Institutional selectivity may operate, for instance, 
to change the frequency of certain activity patterns or to alter the distribution of resources 
(concentration and centralization, e.g. through ratchet effects), to determine the parameters of 
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power, the forms and types of games actors play. A system like capitalism entails generative 
processes of meta-power (based on accumulative processes which provide and distribute 
resource bases (materials, knowledge, social and political arrangements) combined with 
knowledge development to set in motion innovative developments – whether economic, 
socio-technical, and governance -- that impact on other institutions and people’s lives. For 
instance, major new socio-technical systems, once established, operate as quasi-legislative 
bodies shaping and reshaping human conditions and activities. 
The social structural concept of meta-power demonstrates how institutional 
arrangements based on social rules and algorithms of control which organize attention, 
provide definition, encourage and/or limit sensitivity to rules or practices that either in real or 
perceived ways change the form of the institution and its relationship to its environment. 
Altheide (1995) provides a structural analysis of meta-power in the media.  Beginning with 
an analysis of the media as a form and format of social control, Altheide develops the idea 
that relational control of institutional forms has the capacity to generate or limit resistance 
and dissent, subdue criticism, legitimate existing unequal power and exchange relationships, 
and change the manner in which human social life is acted out and experienced.  Thus, meta-
power analysis demonstrates that once developed and legitimated, systems of control have 
the capacity to shape and regulate human awareness, interactions including inter-relational 
power, and, in general, the conditions and opportunities as well as constraints of human 
social life. The stress here is, of course, not on the interpersonal or direct relationships. 
In a similar vein, Hall and McGinty (2002) note how an existing policy context 
structures the policy process through a policy regime, the inclusion/exclusion of actors and 
the distribution of resources among them; a policy paradigm, its basic ideas and values are 
legitimized for policy consideration, and a policy style is defined as the accepted way to 
develop policy form and content. Thus, policies are not created in a vacuum but rather in a 
context that conditions policy processes. While initially formulated as agentic meta-power the 
meso-level analysis has a built-in dialectic between conditions, action, and consequences. 
Since there is an ongoing temporal and spatial orientation, analysts can begin at any point but 
must always be cognizant of the triumvirate.  
Those subordinated to meta-power in both its agential and social structural forms are 
not without some ability to deviate, negotiate, and/or resist. In this sense, control is never 
total because super-ordinates and institutions depend upon the readiness of weaker agents to 
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accept structural conditions and to implement established norms and social relationships. 
There are always varying degrees of discretion and opportunity structures for deviation and 
resistance. 
 In sum, the power paradigm distinguishes two general kinds of social power processes 
and effects: (1) those operating within institutional and cultural arrangements, that is, 
regulatory or modus operandi control of behavior, processes, interaction, material and social 
conditions; (2) those meta-powers operating on social and material structures, shaping, 
restructuring, and transforming them as well as the “internal structures” of agents and entire 
populations (socio-cultural populations). Meta-power operations may make use of the same 
power mechanisms as regulatory forms of power but the motivations and authorization 
typically differ, since intentional change in structure is involved in the exercise of meta-
power here. Moreover, such meta-power invariably entails the use of designs, reform models, 
or new paradigms, since an alternative structure is to be produced and established (Carson et 
al, 2009). 
What makes meta-power analytically useful is not simply the unique perspective that 
it provides on power relationships and the manner in which they are defined; other social 
theorists – most notably the post-structuralist thinkers and feminist scholars – seem to make 
similar arguments about the nature of social power: using "power" to accomplish desirable 
institutional change and structural impacts of established power structures rather than 
stressing one actor's power over another.  Where our conceptualization of meta-power 
differs is in its assumptions about the formation and reformation of social structure and social 
agents' dialectical relationship to these structural conditions.  The earliest formulations of the 
meta-power concept were related to social system stability (morphostasis) and system 
transformation (morphogenesis) (Baumgartner et al, 1975, 1976). This highlighted the 
significance of meta-power as a capacity to influence and shape long-term historical forces 
and to exercise control over institutional and cultural conditions which constrain as well as 
enable cultural and ideological productions and the emergence of new institutional forms.  
The meta-power conceptualization encompasses an appreciation not only of elite 
control (agential) of institutional arrangements as well as normative regimes but also 
institutional arrangements operating as structuring mechanisms: control over the organizing 
of social relationships as well as the situational conditions of interaction; the establishment as 
well as the destruction of opportunity structures; and the shaping of definitions, motivations, 
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and even beliefs and values that social actors embed in their interaction situations 
(Baumgartner et al, 1975; Hall,1997). 
 
IV.  Concluding Remarks 
The theory of causal power mechanism focuses attention on concrete activities, 
controlling acts, cognitive and normative activities of identifying and responding to meanings 
of codes, symbols, and discourses as well as particular institutional arrangements. Social 
power has its interaction and control dimensions (e.g., in groups and organizations) but also 
its social psychological and symbolic interactional dimensions when socialized and 
disciplined members of groups and communities control and regulate themselves. Also, 
material and ecological forces and mechanisms enter into the equation regulating and 
powering human affairs.  
The conceptualization of power presented here has several immediate advantages:46 
 All human power and control systems are made more comparable 
 The causal mechanisms of control differ substantially between the operation of social, 
technical, and natural systems. In other words, in the theory, the actual powering 
mechanisms or processes need to be identified and specified in action/or operational 
terms, i.e., the concrete mechanisms, whether agential control activities, social 
structural constraining and/or enabling operations, or material/ecological constraints 
and forces as well as selective mechanisms. 
 The comparability enables us to explore and develop a much richer and systematic 
conception of the multiple modalities and mechanisms of "causality" relating to 
powering than those developed thus far in the natural and social sciences. 
 The approach identifies the substantial differences between operating regulatory 
systems of power, on the one hand, and the exercise of meta-power – designing, 
constructing and establishing new structures and systems, on the other hand. 
                                                          
46Methodological implications of the theory are several (see Burns and Hall, 2012): In particular, (1) case 
studies of mechanisms, qualitative (structural) and quantitative data; (2) quantitative studies measuring the 
effects of power, or indications of the degree of power. (3) Accumulation of societal powers in multiple systems 
of power and complex networks.  
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 Different types and levels of knowledge are required, skills are different, power 
conditions differ usually, although the actual types of social power mobilized may be 
similar. 
 The approach recognizes human agency, including that among those subject to power 
and control operations (direct as well as indirect). There are, therefore, "game" and 
interaction processes, struggles, negotiations, negotiated outcomes and orders among 
those wielding powers but also between those with great power and those with limited 
or modest powers. 
 The approach focuses attention on types of power modality and the exercise of power 
which play a decisive role in societal development and evolution: (i) the structuring 
and development of institutions and cultural formations, (ii) the formation and 
restructuring of built environments and infrastructures as well as socio-technical 
systems. 
 Societal development can be understood in terms of the capacities to organize and 
control people, resources, systems, infrastructures, territories, time – and the 
development of these multiple capacities over time (Burns and DeVille, 2007; Burns 
and Hall, 2012; Mann, 1986). 
 
The development of societies can be modeled and understood in terms of the inter-
relationships of different power modalities in time and space (Baumgartner et al, 1976). The 
mechanisms in the three modalities typically differ but there is overlap since humans have 
managed to harness for human purposes and design many material-ecological forces for their 
own use, as in the control of water flows, or in the exploitation of electricity and magnetism, 
fossil fuels, or nuclear power.  
 
In closing we want to stress. 
(1) Social power systems (institutional arrangements, infrastructures, socio-
technical systems) as complexes of causality are typically characterized by mechanisms 
which entail "control", "influence", "power over," "power to," etc. However, there is no 
simple typology in the sense that Etzioni, Mann, Russell and others have suggested (see 
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earlier). Agential powering involves actions/operations which influence/control; different 
types of actions vis-à-vis others are labeled as types of power, each activity (or potential 
activity) is identified by its main causal operations or mechanisms. 
Some instances of agential powering do not depend on one agent operating in relation 
to another (controlling, manipulating, persuading) regulating performance or only to a very 
limited extent, but rather they depend on “social action” initiatives of the controlee; in other 
words, there may not be any obvious or immediate “controller” in the interaction situation. 
Causality operates inside the (socialized & committed) agent who responds to socially 
meaningful signals, symbols, and situations and who follows or implements a norm, ritual, 
procedure, or role (along with other agents). Of course, some or many of these powers were 
introduced and sanctioned by teachers, authorities, or self-learning mechanism sometime in 
the past. And, in some cases, there are agents who serve to reinforce adherence to the rules. 
We have identified a number of social structural powering mechanisms that do not 
ostensibly require agential power engagements: 
 People/subjects respond to signals/symbols as in following traffic signals and symbols 
 Some structured systems with which agents deal are automated.  One “logs on” and 
follows pre-established procedures. Deviance leads to failure – in other words, 
sanctions are inherent in the actual situations as in natural/ecological “controls” over 
human behavior. Or sanctions are part of the design of standard operating procedures 
 Rule and symbol causality: Agents attend to established symbols and follow/adhere to 
rules for many reasons (Burns and Flam, 1987): doing so brings identity, status, ideal 
and material rewards, or simply makes sense cognitively 
 
Forms of material or natural powering over humans and their social and material 
structures entail many distinct causal mechanisms: biological, geological, meteorological, etc. 
(see earlier discussion). Many “natural” powering vectors are the result of human actions on 
the natural world (climate change, changes in water courses, water levels, pollution, soil and 
atmosphere degradation, etc. 
Social systems can be considered, under a variety of conditions, as complexes of 
causal mechanisms manifested in social action and interaction processes and their outcomes. 
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These complexes of causal factors are associated with social power and power relationships, 
which are potentialities in action and interaction and related impacts and developments. 
(2) Power relations and power systems are social constructions. That is, most of 
the power relations or power systems in social life are constructed by human agents. This is 
apparent in the case of many institutional arrangements and organizations as well as 
infrastructures and socio-technical systems: such as factories, air traffic control systems, 
railroads, nuclear power plants, IT networks. Included in this array of constructions are 
regulatory arrangements and institutions. These systems consist not only of social 
mechanisms of regulation and control but natural and technical mechanisms (electric, 
mechanical, nuclear energy, etc.). 
(3) Complex systems of power and meta-power can be identified and analyzed as 
such: capitalism, the state, socio-technical systems and infrastructures (Burns, 2007; Burns 
and Hall, 2012). 
(4) The mechanisms (and therefore types) of power can be multiplied – as new 
types of technologies and new socio-technical systems are constructed. New powers are 
constructed by controlling or harnessing new causal mechanisms or operations. For examples 
of new "types of power" consider: (i) "Genetic engineering" based on the use of natural 
mechanisms. Utilizing the knowledge of the life sciences (genetics), there is increasing power 
to manipulate, change, reconstruct life processes of plants, animals, and humans. (ii) Using 
knowledge of psychology, new powers have been developed to influence thinking including 
forms of brainwashing and utilization of the “Stockholm Syndrome”. (iii)  The WWW and 
other social network technologies enable individuals and groups to reach large populations. 
Thus, there are new forms for mass persuasion, mobilizing people and resources in order to 
influence politics and policies. NGOs are very active in all of this. 
In sum, modern society is characterized by a vast array of different power 
mechanisms, which, as we have suggested, can be usefully conceptualized and analyzed 
using the power theoretical framework outlined here. A major type of power in our 
perspective (and also historically and cross-sectionally) is meta-power, namely the capacity 
to change or transform relationships, institutions, cultural formations (cultural-cognitive 
frameworks). There are several key professions which play key roles in modern society in 
this regard: engineering, management, architecture and law are particularly important in the 
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exercise of meta-power in the construction, reconstruction, and transformation of social and 
technical systems in modern society. 
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